This paper analyzes the welfare implications of fixed-price regulation of services in a model in which consumers are heterogenous and a firm can endogenously quality discriminate. We consider two different scenarios: The first scenario is when the consumer is also the payer. The second scenario is when the payer (usually the government) is not the consumer. Our major result is that fixed-price regulation causes a distributional welfare loss. We show that it is not possible for fixed-price regulation to induce providers to supply all consumer types with the first-best quality even under perfect information, under either pricing scenario. We show that high and low demand types may receive more than their respective first-best qualities, less than their first-best qualities, or one type may receive more and the other type less depending on the level of the regulated price. It is always true that when consumers are payers, quality is higher for both types than when consumers are not the payers. In this paper, we motivate and discuss the results in terms of price regulation of hospitals where consumers are patients and patient types vary by severity of illness.
Introduction
This paper analyzes the welfare implications of fixed-price regulation of services in a model in which consumers are heterogeneous and a firm can endogenously quality discriminate. The motivation for this analysis is the current rapid move to prospective pricing of medical services. 1 The Medicare program, which is the largest purchaser of health care services in the United States, pays hospitals with a completely prospectively determined fixed fee per patient. 2 In addition, many state Medicaid programs and private insurers have instituted comparable payment systems, and many of the others are actively considering implementing one. Also, several state Medicaid programs, such as New York's, are using a similar method to pay for nursing home care, and extension of the system to physician services is actively being considered by Medicare and many state Medicaid programs.
The move to prospective pricing is in response to the enormous growth in health care expenditures as a result of retrospective reimbursement of "reasonable costs" and the accompanying high costs of administration. 3 Cost-based reimbursement provided tittle incentive for health care providers to efficiently produce medical care as costs could usually be passed on to the third party payer. In contrast, prospective payment provides incentive for the efficient production of medical services by allowing providers to keep the difference between the price and variable costs. 4 Further, prospective pricing substantially reduces administrative costs by removing the necessity of annual audits of each hospital's financial statement, and the monitoring of the reasonableness of the resources used for every patient admission.
Medicare's prospective payment system pays hospitals a fixed fee per patient admission depending upon which of the approximately 470 "diagnosis related groups" (DRGs) the patient is placed. Once placed in a DRG, the fee is independent of the services (e.g., number of hospitalized days, number of tests, etc.) provided the patient. The amount and type of patient services, which are typically tailored to the medical needs of the individual patient (Harris 1977), can be thought of as the "quality" of hospital care. Quantity can be thought of as the number of admissions. Empirical work in Berki (1984) and Horn (1985) show great variation in severity of illness within DRG categories, implying substantial patient heterogeneity. Thus, the DRG payment structure fixes the price across patient severity of illness types within DRGs, while allowing medical care providers to quality discriminate (i.e., provide different levels of quality to different patients).
The concern voiced most often about prospective pricing is that it may have an adverse effect on health (i.e., patients will leave hospitals "quicker and sicker"). In models with heterogeneous consumers and exogenous quality, Dranove (1987) and Newhouse (1983) argue that prospective payment is an incentive for providers not to admit (transfer) severely ill patients that are likely to be very costly to treat. In a model with endogenous quality and a fixed number of patients (i.e., exogenous quantity), Ellis and McGuire (1986) argue that prospective payment improves efficiency incentives but may also induce providers to reduce quality.
All of these models place strong restrictions on the demand function. Because providers cannot adjust quality in Dranove's and Newhouse's models, the choice set of providers is limited to refusing to treat O.e., transfer) patients. In essence, quality becomes a binary variable; treating the patient in a high quality hospital or transferring to a low quality hospital. Even though Ellis and McGuire consider endogenous quality, by making quantity of patients exogenous, they do not allow quality choices to affect the number of patients a provider attracts and thus eliminate any role for a market for patients.
This paper extends previous analysis by combining consumer heterogeneity (severity of illness) and endogenous quantity of patients into one model. We consider two different scenarios: (1) where the consumer pays for the good or service and (2) where a third party (the government or an insurance company) pays for the good or service. The second case is applicable to DRG hospital reimbursement described above. The first case applies to examples such as taxi services in which fares are regulated and airline services in the pre-deregulation era.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present behavioral
